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I Introduction
This paper shows that U.S. corporations do little to counteract the influence of stock price changes on their capital structures. As a consequence, their debt equity ratios vary closely with fluctuations in their own stock prices. The stock price effects are often large and long-lasting, at least several years. This paper decomposes capital structure changes into effects caused by corporate issuing net of retirement activity (henceforth, called "net issuing" or just "issuing"), and into effects caused by stock returns. While all stock-return caused equity growth can explain about 40% of capital structure dynamics, all corporate issuing activity together can explain about 60% to 70%. Long-term debt issuing is the most capital-structure relevant corporate activity, explaining about 30% of the variation in corporate debt ratio changes.
However, the corporate issuing motives themselves remain largely a mystery.
Issuing activities are not used to counterbalance stock-return induced equity value changes. The better known proxy variables used in the literature-such as tax costs, expected bankruptcy costs, earnings, profitability, market-book ratios, uniqueness, market timing, or the exploitation of undervaluation-also fail to explain much capital structure dynamics when stock value mechanics are accounted for. In previous work, these proxies passively correlated with debt ratios primarily indirectly, because they correlated with omitted stock return caused dynamics. Put differently, these proxies have not so much induced managers to actively engage in altering their capital structures, as much as they have allowed firms to experience different equity values and therefore different capital structures. The proactive managerial component in capital structure remains largely unexplained. The paper concludes that over reasonably long time frames, the stock price effects are considerably more important in explaining debt-equity ratios than previously identified proxies. Stock returns are the primary known component of capital structure and capital structure changes.
II Capital Structure Ratios
My paper investigates whether actual debt ratios by-and-large behave as if firms readjust to their previous debt ratios (targeting a largely static target), or whether they permit their debt ratios to fluctuate with stock prices. The basic specification estimates ADR t+k = α 0 + α 1 · ADR t + α 2 · IDR t,t+k + t .
(1)
ADR is the actual corporate debt ratio, defined as the value of debt (D) divided by the value of debt plus equity (E),
and has been the dependent variable in many capital structure papers. ADR is also a component of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) . IDR is the implied debt ratio that comes about if the corporation issues (net) neither debt nor equity,
where x is the stock return net of dividends. (Whether dividends are included matters little in this study.)
The stark hypotheses are Perfect Readjustment Hypothesis: α 1 = 1 α 2 = 0 , Perfect Non-Readjustment Hypothesis:
Firms could also adopt convex combination strategies, more appropriate than these two "straw man" extremes, and different firms could behave differently. If included, the intercept α 0 can capture a constant target debt ratio. The empirical specifications are primarily cross-sectional.
The dynamics of capital structure that underlie specification (1) can be expressed as follows. The amount of debt changes with new debt issues, debt retirements, coupon payments, and debt value changes. Corporate debt evolves as
where TDNI is the total debt net issuing activity. Equivalently, the amount of corporate equity changes with stock returns (net of dividends), and new equity issues net of equity repurchases. Corporate equity evolves as
where ENI is net equity issuing and stock repurchasing activity. Using these definitions, debt ratios evolve as
Mathematically, if the corporation issues debt and equity so that
then ADR remains perfectly constant across periods (ADR t+k = ADR t ⇒ α 1 = 1, α 2 = 0). In contrast, if the corporation issues debt and equity so that
then IDR perfectly predicts debt ratios (IDR t,t+k = ADR t ⇒ α 1 = 0, α 2 = 1). Unfortunately, equations 8 and 9 are unsuitable for direct cross-sectional estimation, because many firms have zero or tiny debt levels. Table 2 show the median net stock returns of each decile.
III Data
Insert The first five data rows report corporate activity, the sixth row reports equity growth, again all normalized by firm size in the month of activity. Over 1 year, firms respond to poor performance with more debt issuing activity; and to good performance with more equity issuing activity. This hints that firms do not immediately readjust: firms whose debt ratios increase (decrease) due to poor (good) stock return performance seem to use their issuing activities not to readjust, but to amplify the stock return changes (see also Baker and Wurgler (2002) ). However, over both 1-year and 5-year horizons, the relationship is not strong. The fourth row shows that the relationship between stock returns and "activist equity expansion" is more U-shaped when dividends are considered.
The fifth row explores whether firms deliberately expand or contract in response to stock price performance. Over annual horizons, the group average total firm expansion is not only small, but also only a little more pronounced for firms experiencing either very good or very bad stock returns.
Over 5 The actual capital structure relevance of the dynamic components is explored in the three lower rows. The "ending ADR" rows show that there is a large spread of resulting debt ratios across firms having recently experienced different rates of return. Over 1 year, firms that have underperformed the S&P500 by 55% end up with an actual debt ratio of 37%, while firms that have outperformed the S&P500 by 79% end up with an actual debt ratio of 14%. Over 5 years, the worst stock performers end up with debt ratios of 41%, the best stock performers end up with debt ratios of 13%.
The "starting ADR" rows show that the ending debt ratio differences are not due to the originating debt ratios. Over 1 year horizons, starting leverage does not correlate with net return performance: most return deciles start out with actual debt ratios of just about 22%.
Over 5 year horizons, if anything, firms with poorer stock returns start out with lower debt ratios.
Any snapshot of actual debt ratios in the economy therefore reflects differences in historical stock returns. Not in the table, when firms are sorted by ending debt ratios instead of by stock returns (still year and sales adjusted), the lowest decile median debt ratio firm (ADR t = 1%) has experienced +5% stock returns in the most recent year (+53% in the most recent 5 years), while the highest decile median debt ratio firm (ADR t = 75%) has experienced −13% (−19%) stock returns.
The "implied IDR" rows impute the effects of stock returns on starting debt ratios (ADR) in the appropriate non-linear fashion (eq. 3). Can IDR explain future debt ratios better than starting ADR? It appears so. In explaining ending ADR, the implied debt ratio IDR fits visually better than the starting ADR. Of course, all power of my later readjustment tests must derive from the extreme stock return deciles.
There is no economic difference between readjustment and non-readjustment for firms that experience only small stock returns.
IV Estimation A Regression Specification
Insert The basic regression specification of the paper, equation 1, is estimated in Table 3. The reported coefficients and standard errors are computed from the timeseries of cross-sectional regression coefficients (called F-M, for Fama-Macbeth). Both the methods and variables are discussed in detail in the Appendix, as is the robustness to alternatives.
Panel A omits the intercept and thus does not allow for a constant debt ratio target. Over annual horizons, the average firm shows no tendency to revert to its old debt ratio, and instead allows its debt ratio to drift almost one-to-one (102.1%) with stock returns. Over 5 to 10 years, firms began to readjust, but the influence of stock returns through IDR remains more important than the effects of readjustment activity.
Panel B shows that this ADR coefficient reflected less a desire of firms to revert to their starting debt ratios, as a tendency of firms to prevent debt ratios from wandering too far away from a constant: In competition with the constant, ADR loses most economic significance.
I conclude that observed corporate debt ratios at any fixed point in time are largely transient, comoving with stock returns. Any deliberate readjustment is slow and modest.
B Change Regressions
The regression can also be estimated in changes and/or with a restriction that the coefficients on IDR and ADR add up to 1:
Rearranging, the estimated regressions are
The coefficient estimates are highly statistically significant and a first difference term in ADR adds no statistical or economic power. I can conclude that stock return induced equity changes have roughly a one-to-one influence on observed debt ratio changes over 1 year horizons. Even over 5 year horizons, corporate debt ratio reversion activity is rather modest.
C Variance Decomposition
One can isolate the dynamic components laid out in Equation 7. That is, it is possible to predict ADR t+k not only with ADR t updated only for stock returns (which is IDR t,t+k ), but also with ADR t updated, e.g., for corporate issuing activity between t and t + k (keeping other dynamics components at a constant zero).
Insert Table 4 Here: issuing activity would also be mistaken. If the ultimate goal is to explain capital structure, explaining issuing activity alone cannot do the job-even if a researcher could perfectly predict one-hundred percent of all managerial capital structure activities, she would still miss close to half of the variation in year-to-year capital structure changes. And, as Table 5 will show, one hundred percent is utopian.
Explanatory Power of Components of Debt Ratios and Debt Ratio Dynamics:
Previously used variables have little power to explain any of this capital structure relevant managerial activity. Table 4 can also suggest where researchers should focus their efforts to better explain debt ratios: debt issuing activities are more capital structure relevant than equity issuing activities, even though Table 1 activities, yet still only half as important as long-term debt issuing activity.
D Aggregate Effects
The focus of this paper is the cross-section. Still, one can aggregate the debt and market-equity of all firms on Compustat, and use the value-weighted market rate of return to compute IDR. (The results are similar with only firms meeting the size criterion.) The estimated single time-series regression on the aggregate data series
This suggests that the overall stock market level has a similarly long-lived effect on the aggregate corporate debt ratio, just as it is the major influence in determining the debt ratio of firms in cross-section. Unfortunately, the influence of stock returns may be misstated here, because debt is quoted in terms of book value (for lack of available market data); and, unlike in the cross-sectional year-by-year regressions, in these regressions, annual aggregate interest rate changes can drive a considerable wedge between book and market values of debt.
V Alternative Proxy Variables
A natural question is whether the variables used in the prior capital structure and issuing literatures have economic relevance when the effects of stock returns are properly controlled for. For example, corporate profitability was found to predict lower debt ratios in previous studies. If profitability has no incremental significance when IDR is controlled for, then it would have correlated with capital structures only indirectly through its correlation with stock returns. Put differently, managers would not so much have "acted" to lower their debt ratios (by issuing more net equity) when profitability increased. Instead, managers of more profitable companies would have experienced higher stock prices, which in turn would have mechanistically reduced their debt ratios.
Insert Table 5 Here:
Adding Variables Used in Prior Literature.
The multivariate columns in Table 5 estimate
where X t,t+k ≡ IDR t,t+k − ADR t , and V1 through VC are named third variables (described in detail in the Appendix). When a coefficient on Vc is reliably positive, then
Vc incrementally helps to explain actual debt ratios. When a coefficient on Vc×X t,t+k is positive, then Vc incrementally helps to explain readjustment. To avoid multicollinearity, the same specifications are also run with one Vc variable at a time in a 4-variate regression,
The 
The best other proxy is that firms that have taken over other firms also tend to increase leverage; and that firms that wander away from their industry average debt/equity ratio seek to return to it. Asset-based Profitability and Firm Volatility are statistically significant, but only of modest economic importance. The only variable that suggests modestly greater non-adjustment (crossterm) is asset-based profitability: More profitable firms tend to adjust less for stock return induced capital structure changes.
Over five year horizons, return-induced debt ratio changes continue to exert the strongest influence. (The non-standardized coefficient is 82%.) Again, the strong negative coefficient on industry deviation suggests that firms are eager to move towards their industry's average debt ratio, and that firms that have engaged in M&A activity tend to increase leverage. Two of the cross-coefficients indicate good economic significance: firms with more profitable assets and firms with more volatility tend to have avoided readjusting (but recall that return volatility is contemporaneous with ∆IDR). Put differently, in a stratification, their ∆IDR coefficients in a bivariate regression would be significantly higher than those of other firms.
The increase in R 2 , from the 43% in the 1-year difference regression when only IDR is used, to the 54% reported R 2 when the additional 20 variables in Table 5 are included is modest. The increase in R 2 is a more pronounced for the 5-year regressions (40% in the IDR-only regression, 59% in the 20+1 variable regression).
But it is fair to state that the additional 20 variables make only modest headway in reducing the 60% variation that can be attributed to corporate net issuing activity. 3
Most corporate issuing motives remain unexplained.
Some variables had to be excluded from Table 5 , because data availability would have dropped the number of observations in the multivariate specifications. In its own 4-variate specification:
Graham's Tax Rate is an improved iterative tax variable (Graham (2000) ), which over 5 years only works better than the simpler tax variable in Table 5 . Firms with one-standard deviation higher tax rates are likely to take on an additional 2.4% in debt ratio over five years. Firms with higher tax rates are more likely to non-adjust, and in an economically significant fashion.
Interest Coverage Firms with one standard deviation higher high cash flows relative to their interest payments reduced debt over 1 year, but only by 0.4 percent. However, the 5-year cross-variable was economically important, suggesting that firms with more cash flows relative to their earnings readjust less, not more.
(The most significant interest coverage related specification indicates that firms with poor recent returns and very high interest payments are more likely to unlever over the next year-perhaps necessary for survival.)
A number of other variables were found to be unimportant. Three variables are interesting although/because they do not show any significance:
Uniqueness Sales-adjusted R&D and selling expenses (Titman and Wessels (1988)) have no incremental explanatory power over 1 year, and modest explanatory power over 5 years. This is both due to the fact that high R&D firms had good returns and due to the fact that many high R&D equity issuers are already 100% equity financed. (Such issues do not alter capital-structure.)
Future Stock Return Reversals Firms that experience large stock price reversals the year after the measuring period do not behave differently from firms that experience stock price continuation. Managers do not delay readjusting because they know something that the market does not know.
Profitability Changes Firms experiencing current profitability changes show no unusual capital structure activities or tendencies to change their debt ratios over 1 year, and very modest inclination over 5 years. Cross effects do not matter. This indicates that even firms whose stock returns and revised debt ratios are due to or accompanied by immediate cash flow effects (rather than due to long-run discount factor effects or due to far-off growth opportunities) are no more eager to readjust.
In sum, although about half to two-thirds of the dynamics of capital structure are due to net issuing activity, the variables here could not make a large dent in our understanding of resulting capital structure. They could not explain much of the part of capital structure that is not due to stock price changes. The proxies have only modest incremental influence either in predicting higher debt ratios or in predicting higher tendencies to readjust. Much of their correlation with capital structure in earlier papers was due to their correlations with IDR, in many cases, a sufficient statistic. None of these variables change the coefficient on the IDR variable, much less rival it in importance.
VI Interpretation
Corporations are not inactive with respect to issuing activity. This makes it all the more startling that they do not use their capital structure activities to counteract the external and large influences of stock returns on their capital structures. The challenge is to explain why. The answer must lie in the cost-benefit tradeoff to undoing stock return induced capital structure changes. The benefits relate to how the hypothetically friction-free optimal debt ratio shifts with stock returns. The costs relate to direct financial transaction costs or indirect costs of change that can arise from a variety of distortions.
1. Dynamic Optima: If the optimal debt ratio changes one-to-one with stock returns, then there is no need for firms to rebalance towards their previous or static debt ratio targets. For example, if stock prices relate more to changes in discount factors and/or far-away growth opportunities, then firms with positive stock returns would not experience changes in earnings in the near future. They may find that increasing the debt ratio would provide few additional tax benefits in exchange for risking a short-term liquidity crunch or outright bankruptcy (see also Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2001) ). Such theories can at least predict that stock returns correlate negatively with debt ratios (over short horizons), the correct sign.
But, by itself, this explanation has drawbacks. First, the argument is less compelling for Value Firms with already low debt ratios which experience further large positive stock returns. (And a number of authors have argued that such firms already have too little debt. 4 ) Such firms show no greater tendency to readjust or lever up. Second, even firms experiencing the most immediate increases in profitabilityi.e., firms whose stock price movements are less likely due to far-away growth opportunities or discount rate changes-do not show any differences in their readjustment tendencies. Third, it would be curious if the optimal dynamic debt ratio were as one-to-one with stock-priced induced changes in equity values, as the evidence suggests.
Direct Transaction Costs:
This suggests that another part of the explanation is likely to be transaction costs. Transaction costs cannot only induce path dependency, but also produce flat corporate objective functions (Miller (1977) , Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) , Leland (1998) ). The fact that there is more readjustment over longer horizons is also consistent with transaction costs playing a role.
But by itself, this explanation, too, has some drawbacks.
First, for large U.S. Corporations, direct transaction costs are small, and practitioners believe them to be small (Graham and Harvey (2001) ).
Second, readjustment patterns are similar across firms where transaction costs are very different. Even if transaction costs are high for a firm that issues equity to reduce debt in response to falling enterprise valuation, 5 they are low for a firm that issues debt to repurchase equity in response to increasing enterprise valuation.
Similarly, small firms should have higher transaction costs than large firms; and yet Table 5 shows that large firms are no more eager to readjust. Finally, even firms 4 The average (median) operating income divided by interest payments in the sample is 43 (6.5), suggesting only a modest probability of bankruptcy for many firms. An otherwise typical firm in the sample ($500 million size, 33% tax rate, 25% debt ratio) that experiences a 5% debt-equity ratio change should issue $40 million in debt, thus obtaining about 33% · $40 ≈ $13 million (perpetual NPV) in tax savings. Graham (2000) calculates that the average publicly traded firm could gain about 10% in firm value if it increased its debt ratio. 5 However, first a debt ratio can also be reduced by selling off assets to pay off debt or by using former dividends to repurchase debt. Second, equity values would have already fallen significantly, and an equity-for-debt exchange (e.g., with existing creditors) should increase enterprise value, not decrease it (absent direct frictions).
experiencing the most dramatic changes in debt ratios readjust very little, too. This suggests that inventory-type transaction cost minimization models (under which one should observe more readjustment for larger deviations from the optimum) are not likely to explain the evidence.
Third, firms do not seem to lack the inclination to be capital structure active.
They just seem to lack the proper inclination to readjust for equity value changes! (A more consistent transaction cost argument may have to suggest that transaction costs are higher after large positive or negative equity movements.) And if corporations really wanted to readjust at low transaction costs, they could issue securities that convert automatically into debt when corporate values increase and into equity as corporate values decrease-the opposite of convertible securities. They do not.
Indirect Costs:
A number of theories can explain why firms face implicit costs to reacting or adjusting, either actual or perceived. These suffer from similar problems as direct transaction cost explanations: they can explain inertia better than lack of readjustment, although firms are very active in real life, instead. Moreover, few tests of such theories have explored their unique non-inertia implications.
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf (1984) , Myers (1984) ) is not the only model of inertia, but it is the most prominent. Firms are reluctant to raise more equity when their stock prices deteriorate because of negative inference by investors. The theory is known to have more difficulties explaining why firms are reluctant to rebalance more towards debt when their stock prices increase. To its credit, the pecking order theory does not need to rely on an agency explanation (debt discipline) to explain an additional fact, the negative stock price response to equity issuing activity.
Other theories can predict corporate inertia if firms suffer from limited memory retention (e.g., Hirshleifer and Welch (2002) ); if agency or influence problems paralyze the firm (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (2000) ); if managers believe that their equity is too expensive/cheap for repurchases after stock price increases/decreases (e.g., Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) ); if managers prefer equity to debt and increasing equity values make them harder to dislodge (e.g., Zwiebel (1995)); or if firms en-gage in near-rational or irrational behavior (e.g., Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) , Benartzi and Thaler (2001) ).
Finally, one could argue that different reasons drive corporate behavior on the upside and on the downside. For example, on the upside, managers may become more entrenched and dislike issuing debt (or exchanging equity for debt); while on the downside, managers may believe (or have inside information) that their firms have become too "undervalued," and dislike selling equity (or exchanging debt for equity).
VII Prior Capital Structure Literature
My paper has shown that stock returns and stock return adjusted historical capital structure are the best variables forecasting market-based capital structure.
Some prior literature has examined capital structure ratios not only based on market equity value, but also book equity value. Yet, the book value of equity is primarily a "plug number" to balance the LHS and RHS of the Balance Sheet-and it can even be negative. Furthermore, book values correlate less with market values among small firms. But more importantly, accounting rules imply that the book value of equity increases with historical cash flows and decreases with asset depreciation. Not surprisingly, profitability (growth) and fixed assets are the important predictors of book-value based debt ratios (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) ).
Yet, some authors find book values attractive, because they have lower volatility than market equity values, and therefore permit corporate issuing activity to appear more important.
In any case, compared to book value based debt ratios, interest coverage ratios would be a much better alternative for measuring the advantages of debt to firms.
Operating cash flows (or cash) may be the best available measure of assets-in-place and tax advantages. Immediate interest payments may be the best measure of potential bankruptcy and liquidity problems. Thus, tradeoff theories may be better tested with the ratio of current interest burden to current operating cash flows (or cash). Moreover, managers are known to pay attention to coverage ratios, and credit ratings (which are in turn highly related to coverage ratios). But before one sets one's hopes too high, the typical firm paid out only about 15% of its operating cash flows in interest, indicating that most firms could probably have easily borrowed more.
My evidence of readjustment failure is in line with the survey responses in Graham and Harvey (2001) : queried executives apparently care little about either transaction costs, or most theories of optimal capital structure, or rebalancing when equity values change. To the extent that they do care when actively issuing, managers claim they care about financial flexibility and credit ratings for debt issues; and about earnings dilution and past stock price appreciation for equity issues. Yet, executives also claim that they issue equity to maintain a target debt-equity ratio, especially if their firm is highly levered-for which we could not find much evidence.
Most existing empirical literature has interpreted capital structure from the perspective of proactive managerial choice. Titman and Wessels (1988) find that only "uniqueness" (measured by R&D/sales, high selling expenses, and employees with low quit rates) and earnings are reliably important. Rajan and Zingales (1995) offer the definitive description of OECD capital structures and find a strong negative correlation between market-book ratios and leverage. Like Rajan and Zingales, Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) find that debt ratios are negatively related to market/book ratios. Graham (2003) surveys the voluminous tax literature. Havakimian et al. (2001) find a mild tendency of firms to issue in order to return to a target debtequity accounting ratio. The implied debt ratio can subsume most of the variables in this literature. Baker and Wurgler (2002) investigate the influence of past stock market returns (see also Rajan and Zingales (1995) ). But they are interested in how these returns influence the active issuing decisions of firms, and do not consider the implied change. My own paper is more interested in the failure of firms to undo the effects of stock returns, and the consequent strong relation between lagged stock returns and capital structure. Other literature has focused on non-action, though none has focused on the dramatic fluctuations that non-action can cause. In addition to pecking order tests (such as Fama and French (2002) and Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) ), some theories have been built on transaction costs. For example, Fischer et al. (1989) use option pricing theory and find that even small recapitalization costs can lead to wide swings in optimal debt ratios.
Finally, some behavioral finance papers find similar lack of readjustment in other contexts. For example, Thaler, Michaely and Benartzi (1997) find that, in contrast to optimizing theories of dividend payments, managers seem to pay dividends more in response to past earnings than in response to an expectation of future earnings. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) find that "1/N" diversification heuristics are more powerful than the effects of stock market value changes in pension portfolio adjustments.
VIII Conclusion
Market-based debt ratios describe the relative ownership of the firm by creditors and equity holders, and they are an indispensable input in WACC computations. This paper has shown that stock returns are a first order determinant of debt ratios; that they are perhaps the only well understood influence of debt ratio dynamics;
and that many previously used proxies seem to have helped explain capital structure dynamics primarily because they correlated with omitted dynamics caused by stock price changes.
Appendix A Method and Variable Details
A. Variable Definitions:
D t The sum of long-term debt (Compustat item [9] ) and debt in current liabilities ([34] ).
Convertible securities are excluded. Broader definitions were tried and found not to impact the results. Assets Assets, defined by [6], adjusted to 2000 levels using the CPI.
ADR t Actual Debt Ratio: D t /(E t + D t ). The dependent variable. All results, including the relative importance of debt issuing and equity issuing, are invariant to predicting an actual equity ratio (AER) instead of ADR (because AER ≡ 1 − ADR t ); or to predicting
r t,t+k Stock returns with dividends, from CRSP.
x t,t+k Stock returns without dividends, from CRSP.
In Tables 1 and 2 , ENI, DIV, and Induced Equity Growth were obtained from the sum of market values minus lagged market values adjusted by compounded returns. The reported statistics sit about halfway between statistics normalized by firm value at the beginning of the period (t) and statistics normalized by firm value at the end of the period (t + k).
TDNI t,t+k Difference in total debt value: D t+k − D t . ENI t,t+k Difference in total equity value sans return and dividend effects:
All independent stock variables used in Table 5 have to be known at the outset, i.e., at time t, when predicting ADR t+k . All flow variables are measured over the same time interval as the rate of return, i.e., from t to t + k. (Over 5 years, the reported SDV's are for the average over the 5 flow variables, not the sum.) Log Rel. Mkt. Cap. E divided by the price level of the S&P500. Always greater than 0.1.
Deviation from Industry Debt Ratio (Industry herding or conformity.) ADR of a firm minus the ADR average in its three-digit SIC code industry. (Similar answers are obtained if two-digit industry definitions are used instead.) This variable was also used in Havakimian et al. (2001) . MacKay and Philips (2002) independently provide a more detailed examination of industry capital structure. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1998) review the herding literature. Graham (2000) .
Independent variables described in the text following

Future Stock Return Reversals
This variable is not fully known at time t. It multiplies the stock returns from t, t + k with stock returns from t + k, t + 2k. Thus, the variable measures "future price continuation" (consecutive positive and consecutive negative rates of return result in positive values). Not winsorized.
Profitability Changes This variable is not fully known at time t. Profitability divided by sales, an average from t to t + k, minus Profitability divided by sales at t − 2. Other definitions were tried, and not found to make a difference. Not winsorized.
In some cases, various variable definitions were explored. The results were robust, in that no reported insignificant variable achieved significance in alternatives, and vica-versa. errors are therefore ignored.) In general, the reader is well advised to ignore statistical standard errors. Statistical significance at conventional significance levels is rarely lacking. The reader's first concern should be the economic meaning of the coefficients, not their statistical significance.
Pooling all firm-years (instead of F-M) does not change coefficient estimates: for example, a 1-year pooled regressions has coefficients of 2.7%, 101.7%, and -5.9%, instead of the reported 2.7%, 101.4%, and -5.3% coefficients in the F-M method. Fixed-effects regressions keep the IDR coefficient at about the same level, but drop the ADR coefficient, in some cases to -30%.
When horizons are more than 1 year, the same firm can appear in overlapping regressions. Overlap does not change the coefficient estimates: for example, in a 10-year regression that is run with three non-overlapping periods (1970-1980; 1980-1990; 1990-2000) , the coefficient estimates are 13.9%, 75.1%, and 6.0%, instead of the reported 13.8%, 70.8%, and 6.9% coefficients in the paper. Statistical significance drops mildly, but no reported inference in this paper changes.
Not reported, the F-M coefficient estimates typically have negative serial correlation.
For example, the coefficient time-series of IDR in the annual regressions displays a negative serial correlation of about −50%, which implies that the critical 5% level is around 1.1, not 1.96. This negative serial correlation in coefficients implies that the standard errors are overstated. However, although for the 1-year levels regressions, the firm-specific residuals from the cross-sectional regressions also have on average a negative −12% time-series correlation (from regression to regression), this is not the case for the differences regression (+30% correlation). The rolling overlap in the 5-year regressions further increases the same-firm residual correlation (to +42%). This average positive serial correlation in residuals implies that the standard errors are understated. Fortunately, even if one increases the standard error by a factor of √ T = 37 ≈ 6 (i.e., a worst case) or used the average crosssectional standard error instead of the time-series variation in the F-M coefficients, the inferences in Table 3 would not change. And in Table 5 , it is the economic significance of the variable coefficients that is emphasized, anyway.
The residuals in cross-sectional or pooled regressions have a nice bell shape and are generally well behaved. In cross-sectional regressions, unit-roots are not a concern (even if the autocoefficient is close to 1).
C. Other Robustness Checks
Reported results in Table 2 are robust with respect to the use of means rather than medians (or vica-versa). All results are robust with respect to the use of various scale controls; and with respect to different definitions of debt, specifically to the use of shortterm and investment grade debt only (so that the debt is almost risk-free, which eliminates much concern about the use of debt book value rather than the debt market value).
Unfortunately, the more interesting hypothesis that firms target an optimal debt ratio (rather than just their past debt ratio) is not explorable due to lack of identification of an "optimum"-both theoretically and empirically. However, added lags in actual debt ratio terms in the regressions have no significance. Table 2 is probably influenced by survivorship bias.)
The robustness of the specifications in Table 5 was confirmed with alternatives in which either the plain or the crossed variable were included only by themselves. Fur-ther, the lack of cross-sectional predictability in readjustment tendency (the cross-term) also clearly shows up when we use each variable to classify observations into quintiles, and compare the IDR/ADR coefficients across quintiles. The estimated coefficients on IDR are always close to 1 in all quintile subcategories and not very different from one another.
The one exception is M&A activity in the latter half of the sample period: in a classification Explanation: All numbers are medians and quoted in percent. Firms are sorted first by calendar year, then by sales decile (to control for size), and then allocated to deciles based on their stock return rank (within each group of 10 firms). In each panel, the first six rows are normalized by firm size in the month of issue; the last three rows are not. Reported coefficients and standard error estimates are computed from the timeseries of cross-sectional regression coefficients, and quoted in percent. A coefficient of 100% on implied debt ratio (IDR t,t+k ) indicates perfect lack of readjustment, a coefficient of 100% on actual debt ratio (ADR t ) indicates perfect readjustment. R 2 's are time-series averages of cross-sectional estimates. 60,317 firm-years are used in the 1-year regressions, 25,180 in the 10-year regressions. T is the number of cross-sectional regressions. Explanation: The reported coefficient estimates are computed from the time-series of crosssectional regression coefficients, and quoted in percent. Except for the intercept, variables were unit-normalized (coefficients were multiplied by SDV, the standard deviation of the variable). One/two/three stars means a F-M-type t-statistic above 3/4/5. The multivariate columns are the coefficients from one big specification. The 4-Variate columns are the coefficients from individual specifications, one variable V at a time, ADR t+k −ADR t = α 0 +α 1 ·X t,t+k +α 2 ·V +α 3 ·V ×X t,t+k + t+k . 4-Variate regressions avoid multicollinearity.
